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 
Abstract—Telecare Medicine Information Systems (TMIS) provides flexible and 
convenient e-health care. However the medical records transmitted in TMIS are 
exposed to unsecured public networks, so TMIS are more vulnerable to various types 
of security threats and attacks. To provide privacy protection for TMIS, a secure and 
efficient authenticated key agreement scheme is urgently needed to protect the 
sensitive medical data. Recently, Mishra et al. proposed a biometrics-based 
authenticated key agreement scheme for TMIS by using hash function and nonce, 
they claimed that their scheme could eliminate the security weaknesses of Yan et al.’s 
scheme and provide dynamic identity protection and user anonymity. In this paper, 
however, we demonstrate that Mishra et al.’s scheme suffers from replay attacks, 
man-in-the-middle attacks and fails to provide perfect forward secrecy. To overcome 
the weaknesses of Mishra et al.’s scheme, we then propose a three-factor 
authenticated key agreement scheme to enable the patient enjoy the remote 
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healthcare services via TMIS with privacy protection. The chaotic map-based 
cryptography is employed in the proposed scheme to achieve a delicate balance of 
security and performance. Security analysis demonstrates that the proposed scheme 
resists various attacks and provides several attractive security properties. 
Performance evaluation shows that the proposed scheme increases efficiency in 
comparison with other related schemes. 
 
Index Terms—Telecare medicine information systems; Privacy protection; 
Authenticated key agreement; Chaotic maps; Security 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 dvances in information technology and environmental concerns boost the rapid 
development of Electronic Medical Record/Electronic Health Record (EHR) systems, 
which collect, store, manage and share patient’s healthcare associated information. 
Compared with traditional paper-based method, EMR/EHR provides low cost, high quality 
and more flexible medical records [1]. Owing to this transmission, Telecare Medicine 
Information Systems (TMIS) have been deployed to provide healthcare delivery services 
by accessing EMR/EHR via the public network like Internet [2]. In a typical medical 
application scenario of TMIS as shown in Fig. 1, patients submit their healthcare data to a 
telecare server via wired/wireless medical devices in their home. After receiving the 
patient’s medical records, the doctors perform the diagnosis at their clinical center and then 
transform the final clinical decisions and treatments to the patients through the Internet. 
Since the TMIS realizes convenient and efficient healthcare beyond the limitation of 
A
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geographical distance, it attracts great attention and spreads into the market quickly [3-6]. 
 
Fig. 1 Typical medical application scenario of TMIS. 
However, the sensitive medical records transmitted over the the Internet are not protected 
in most TMIS environments, and various attacks could be launched successfully by 
malicious adversaries. To protect patient’s medical records, TMIS based healthcare should 
satisfy fundamental security and privacy requirements such as authentication, 
confidentiality, integrity, and user anonymity [7, 8]. As the authentication mechanism can 
prevent the medical resources from being accessed by malicious attackers and the session 
key used to encrypt the packets can ensure the confidentiality of EMR/HER, many 
authenticated key agreement schemes [9-13] have been developed to protect medical 
records security and preserve patient’s privacy. For example, the authentication schemes 
for HIPAA privacy and security regulations [9-11] were proposed to provide authorization, 
authentication and key management. The software solution [12] for sharing and querying 
of HL7 version 3 clinical documents was presented to provide security for data providers 
and protect the patients’ privacy. 
Recently, passwords and smartcards based authenticated key agreement schemes have 
been studied widely for TMIS [14-19]. However, these schemes have some limitations. 
Firstly, both smartcards and passwords could be forgotten, lost, stolen or duplicated. 
Secondly, if the authorized users share their smart cards and passwords with unauthorized 
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users, there is no way for the system to tell who the actual user is. Thirdly, some of these 
schemes [14-15] require the server to maintain a password table for verification purposes, 
making them suffers from some possible attacks such as password disclosure attacks, 
stolen-verifier attacks and server-spoofing attacks.  Besides, user’s passwords are 
potentially vulnerable to offline password guessing attacks since their entropy are usually 
very low. To enhance the security, biometric characteristics are employed as a third factor 
to design a strong authentication scheme. Since the combination of the three factors can 
resist guess, forget, stolen, and duplicate issues [20], the three factors-based authentication 
schemes overcome the weaknesses existing in two-factor schemes. As the three factors 
provide many attractive properties, several three-factor authentication and key agreement 
schemes have been proposed for TMIS [21-28]. 
In order to design a three-factor authenticated key agreement scheme, several 
cryptographic algorithms were employed such as one-way hash function, Chaotic maps, 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), RSA cryptosystem and some other operations like 
X-OR and concatenate etc. Compared with RSA, ECC offers equivalent security with 
smaller key sizes which implies lower power, bandwidth, and computational requirements 
[29-31]. In addition, the computation of chaotic map operations is less complex than the 
ECC and RSA [32-36], so it is more efficient for designing a mutual authentication 
scheme.  
By deploying symmetric key encryption technique and hash function, Awasthi and 
Srivatava [21] proposed a lightweight three-factor authenticated key agreement scheme for 
TMIS. Although their design is efficient, several security drawbacks were identified by 
Mishra et al. [22] and Tan [23]. Mishra et al. pointed out that Awasthi and Srivatava’s 
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scheme could not resist password guessing attacks. Besides, their scheme failed to detect 
the wrong input in password change phase, and this failure might cause denial-of-service 
attacks in future login phase. Tan demonstrated that Awasthi and Srivatava’s scheme was 
vulnerable to reflection attacks and did not achieve user anonymity and three-factor 
security. To tackle these problems, Tan presented an improved scheme. However, later 
analysis [24] showed that Tan’s scheme suffered from replay attacks and denial-of-service 
attacks. To overcome the weaknesses, Yan et al. [25] proposed a new scheme and claimed 
that their scheme was secure against various attacks. Nevertheless, Mishra et al. [26] 
argued that Yan et al.’s design was vulnerable to offline password guessing attacks, and 
failed to provide efficient login and password updating as well as user anonymity. And 
then, they presented an authentication scheme by using the hash function and nonce to 
enhance the security. Recently, Mrudula et al.’s [27] pointed out that Mishra et al.’s 
scheme [26] was insecure against the offline identity guessing attack and the user 
impersonation attack. Amin and Biswas [28] argued that Mishra et al.’s scheme [26] could 
not withstand the server impersonation attack, the session key computation attack and the 
smart card theft attack. In this paper, we demonstrated that Mishra et al. scheme [26] could 
not resist the replay attack and the man-in-the-middle attack, and failed to provide perfect 
forward secrecy.  
To enhance the security while still preserve the efficiency of Mishra et al.’s scheme [26], in 
this study, we develop an improved authenticated key agreement scheme for TMIS which 
enables the patients to enjoy the remote healthcare services securely and anonymously. 
Although Amin et al. [28] presented an improvement scheme based on Mishra et al.’s 
scheme, their scheme suffered from the known session specific temporary information 
 6
attack [37] and increase the computational costs. In order to achieve a delicate balance 
between performance and security, chaotic map-based cryptography [38] is employed in 
the proposed scheme. Since chaotic map operations possess the semi-group property, it is 
more efficient than modular exponential computation and point multiplication operations 
of elliptic curve [32-36, 39-40]. The proposed three factor authentication scheme not only 
achieves mutual authentication and key agreement by using Chebyshev chaotic map but 
also enhances the performance in comparison with other related schemes.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly review Mishra et al.’s 
scheme [26]. Section III describes a cryptanalysis of Mishra et al.’s scheme [26]. Our 
authenticated key agreement scheme is presented in Section IV. In Section V, the security 
of the proposed scheme is discussed. The performance of the scheme is examined in 
Section VI, and the paper is concluded in Section VII. 
II. REVIEW OF MISHRA ET AL.’S SCHEME 
In this section, we briefly review Mishra et al.’s biometrics based authentication scheme 
[26]. Their protocol consists of five phases: registration phase, login phase, authentication 
phase, and password and biometrics update phase. The notations used throughout this 
paper are summarized in TABLE I. 
TABLE I 
Notations and Terminology 
Sym
bol 
Notations and terminology  
S Telecare server in TMIS 
Ui Patients in TMIS 
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SC Smart card 
IDi The identity of the patient Ui 
PWi The password of the patient Ui  
Bi The biometric data of the patient 
Ui  
mk The master key of the telecare 
server S 
h(.) Secure one-way hash function 
H(.) Secure Biohashing function 
Ek(.) Symmetric key encryption 
algorithm using k 
Dk(.) Symmetric key decryption 
algorithm using k 
Tu(x) Chebyshev chaotic map operation
 Matching algorithm of biometrics
|| String concatenation operation 
  Exclusive-or operation 
A. Registration phase 
When a patient  Ui  wants to register in the TMIS, it performs following steps with the 
telecare server S through a secure channel. 
Step R1: the patient Ui selects its identity IDi, its password PWi  and a random number Ni . 
Then it imprints its biometrics  Bi  via the sensor and computes ( )i i iW h ID PW N . Finally, 
Ui submits (W, IDi ) to the telecare server S. 
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Step R2: the telecare server S chooses a high entropy integer x as its private key. And then it 
computes ( )i iX h ID x , i iY X W  , and generates Ui’s dynamic identity (xNID E  )iID R , 
where R is a random integer. Next, S stores {NID, Yi, h(.)}  into the smart card and submits 
it to Ui . 
Step R3: upon receiving the smart card,  Ui  computes N=  ( )i iN H B and ( )i i i iV h ID PW N . 
Next it stores (N, Vi) into the smart card and keep the smart card secretly. 
B. Login phase 
When a patient Ui accesses to the telecare server, it inserts its smart card into the card 
reader. And then the smart card and the telecare server execute the following steps: 
Step L1: the patient Ui inputs (IDi, PWi) and imprints its biometrics Bi via a sensor. 
Step L2: the smart card computes ( )i iN N H B   and verifies whether the equation 
( )i i i iV h ID PW N  holds. If it is invalid, the login session is rejected. Otherwise, the smart 
card computes ( )i i iW h ID PW N , i iX Y W   and generates ri to obtain ( )i i i ia h ID X r . At 
last, the smart card sends login message {NID, ai, ri} to the telecare server S. 
C. Authentication phase 
Upon receiving the login message, the telecare server S and the patient  Ui  perform the 
following steps to achieve mutual authentication. 
Step A1: the telecare server S retrieves  IDi  by decrypting NID from the receiving message. 
Then it computes ( )i iX h ID x  and verifies whether the equation (i ia h ID  )i iX r holds. If 
the verification does not hold, S terminates the session. Otherwise, S generates two random 
integers rs and 'R to compute the shared session key ( )i i i ssk h ID X r r , 
' '( )x iNID E ID R and '( )i ib h ID NID sk NID . Afterwards, S sends '{ , , ( ) )s i ir b h sk ID NID  to 
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the patient Ui. 
Step A2: after receiving the message, the smart card computes the shared session key 
( )i i i ssk h ID X r r  and retrieves the Ui’s dynamic identity ' ( )iNID h sk ID   '( )ih sk ID NID . 
Then, it verifies whether the result of '( )ih ID NID sk NID  is equal to the received message 
bi. If not, the smart card stops the session. Otherwise, the smart card computes 
'( )i ic h ID NID sk  and sends ci as the session key verification message to the telecare server 
S.  
Step A3: upon receiving the message ci, the telecare server S verifies whether the equation 
'( )i ic h ID NID sk  holds. If not, it terminates the authentication session. Otherwise, Ui is 
authenticated, and the shared session key sk is valid. 
D. Password and biometrics update phase 
The patient can change its password and biometric without server assistance. 
Step P1: the patient Ui inserts the smart card into the card reader and inputs its identity IDi  
and its password PWi , and then imprints its biometrics Bi  via a sensor. 
Step P2: the smart card checks whether all the inputs are valid. If not, it stops the session. 
Otherwise, the smart card requires the patient to submit her/his new identity information. 
Step P3: the patient Ui selects a new password 'iPW , a new random number 'iN , and imprints 
a new biometrics 'iB . 
Step P4: upon receiving the message, the smart card 
computes ( )i i iW h ID PW N , ' '( )new i i iW h ID PW N , new i newY Y W W   , ' '( )new i i iV h ID PW N  
and newN N   '( )iH B . Finally, the smart card replaces the old message (Yi, Ni, Vi) with the 
new identity information (Ynew, Nnew, Vnew).  
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III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF MISHRA ET AL.’S SCHEME  
In this section, we describe our findings that the scheme of Mishra et al. [26] is vulnerable 
to the replay attack, the man-in-the-middle attack, and failed to provide perfect forward. 
Before that, an attacker model [41, 42] is defined as follows. 
A. Attack model 
1) The adversary can extract the values stored in the smartcard by some ways like 
monitoring their power consumption and reverse engineering techniques [43, 44]. 
2) The adversary can control the communication channel, that is, it may eavesdrop, 
intercept, modify, remove, and replay any message transmitted over the public channel. 
3) The adversary may be a legitimate but malicious user or server in TMIS. 
4) An attacker can guess a low entropy password and identity individually easily but 
guessing two secret parameters (e.g. password, identity) is computationally infeasible in 
polynomial time [45]. 
Under these assumptions, an attacker Eve can extract the information {NID, Yi, N, Vi} from 
the smartcard, and record all the messages transmitted via the public channel. Then, the 
scheme cannot resist the offline identity guessing attack, the replay attack, the 
Man-in-the-middle attack and fails to provide perfect forward secrecy. 
B. Suffer from the offline identity guessing attack  
In this subsection, we review that Mishra et al.’s scheme suffers from offline identity 
guessing attacks which demonstrated by Mrudula et al. [27].  And we also discuss why this 
attack can be easily launched. 
Assume that the adversary Eve compromises the secret information （NID, Yi, N, Vi） stored 
in the smart card and eavesdrops previous login messages（NID, ai, ri）. In Mishra et al.’s 
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scheme [26], since the secret information (i i iV h ID PW  )iN W , Eve can deduce 
that ( ) (i i i i ia h ID X r h ID   ) ( )i i i i i iY W r h ID Y V r   . Then, she can launch the offline 
identity guessing attack to obtain the patient real identity. First, Eve guesses the value of 
*
iID from an identity dictionary space and then computes * *(i ia h ID  )i i iY V r  where Yi and 
Vi are stored in the smart card and ri is eavesdropped from the public channel. Then, Eve 
compares the computed value *ia  with the intercepted value ai. If they are equal, Eve gets 
the correct identity of the patient Ui. Otherwise, Eve selects another identity from the 
dictionary and try it again until finds the correct identity. Once the adversary successfully 
guesses the patient’s identity, she/he can trace and derive valuable messages of the patient. 
Therefore, Mishra et al.’s scheme [26] cannot achieve user anonymity and user 
untraceability. 
Since the identity guesses attack mentioned above do not need to interact with the telecare 
server, this attack is easy to launch. Suppose that the length of patient Ui’s identity space is 
i  and the time complexity of this attack process is ( )i hO T  , here Th denotes the time for 
operating a hash function. Since the function ( )i hO T    is a linear function of Ui’s identity 
space, the identity guesses attack mentioned above is a lightweight attack.  
C. Suffer from the replay attack 
From above analysis, the attacker can obtain the valid identity by launching the offline 
identity guessing attack. Then, we demonstrate Mishra et al.’s scheme [26] suffers from 
replay attack using the compromised identity. Suppose an adversary Eve records the old 
login message and replays it to the telecare server S. Then Eve can retrieve the new 
dynamic identity 'NID  from the receiving message  *, , || 's i ir b h sk ID NID  by using the 
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computed session key  * *|| || ||i i i i ssk h ID Y V r r  via the compromised identity IDi and the 
message (Yi, Vi) stored in the smart card. Consequently, Eve can construct a valid 
 *|| ' ||i ic h ID NID sk  to pass the verification of telecare server S. Under this case, the 
adversary Eve could be authenticated as a legal patient by launching the replay attacks. 
D. Suffer from the Man-in-the-middle attack 
Since the adversary Eve can impersonate a patient Ui to cheat the telecare server S [27], 
then she can share a session key with the telecare server S and makes it believes that the key 
is shared with the patient Ui. On the other hand, Eve can also impersonate the telecare 
server S [28], so that she can convince the patient Ui to share a session key, making it 
believes that the key is shared with the telecare server S. Therefore, Mishra et al.’s scheme 
[26] could not resist the man-in-the-middle attack. 
E. No provision of perfect forward secrecy 
In Mishra et al.’s scheme [26], once the telecare server’s long-term private key x is 
revealed, all the previous session keys would be compromised.  Suppose that an adversary 
Eve has compromised the secret private key x and obtained previous messages.   Then   the   
adversary   Eve   intercepts   the   login messages {NID, ai, ri} and obtains the patient Ui ’s 
real identity by decrypting ( )x iNID E ID R  with the compromised private key x. Next, Eve 
can compute ( )i iX h ID x via the compromised identity IDi, and then she can computes the 
previous session keys ( )i i i ssk h ID X r r by using the computed Xi, the compromised 
identity IDi  and the intercepted message (ri, rs).  
Since the security of Mishra et al.’s scheme [26] is independent on some intractable 
mathematical problems, their session key could be broken when the telecare server S’s 
secret private key is revealed. Additionally, according to above analysis, the security of 
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Mishra et al.’s scheme [26] entirely replies on the patient’s real identity. However, the 
patient’s identity can be leaked in various ways, so Mishra et al.’s scheme [26] could not 
provide a proper security at an acceptable level for TMIS in practice. 
IV. OUR PROPOSED SCHEME 
As demonstrated in Section V, Mishra et al.’s scheme [26] fails to achieve the claimed 
security goals since an adversary can perform a guessing attack to obtain the patient’s real 
identity and then she/he can launch various attacks successfully. In addition, their scheme 
could not provide perfect forward secrecy since the security of their scheme was 
independent on the intractable mathematical problems. In order to erase above security 
weaknesses, we present an improved authentication scheme by combining the three-factor 
authentication technology with the chaotic map-based cryptography.  
Firstly, we review the basics of Chebyshev chaotic maps briefly. For more details, please 
refer to [46, 47]. 
Chebyshev polynomial ( ) : ( , ) [ 1, 1]nT x        defined    as 1 2( ) (2 ( ) ( )) modn n nT x xT x T x p    , 
where ( , )x   , n is an integer, 0 12, ( ) 1, ( )n T x T x x   , and p is  a  large prime  number.  
The Chebyshev polynomial satisfies the semi-group property: ( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))uv v u u vT x T T x T T x  , 
where ,u v N and ( , )x   .  
Definition 1   Chaotic   Map   Discrete Logarithm   problem (CMDLP): Given two 
elements y and x, it is computationally infeasible to find an integer u such that ( )uT x y . 
Definition 2   Chaotic Map Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CMCDHP): Given 
x, ( ), ( )u vT x T x , it is computationally infeasible to compute ( )uvT x y . 
We assume that above two problems are intractable. That is, there is no polynomial time 
algorithm solving these problems with non-negligible probability. 
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Next, we describe the proposed chaotic map-based three factor authenticated key 
agreement scheme in detail.  The proposed scheme consists five phases:  initialization 
phase, registration phase, login phase, authentication phase, and password and biometrics 
update phase. 
A. Initialization phase 
In this phase,  the telecare server S chooses a high entropy integer x randomly, a high 
entropy random integer mk as a master key, a secure one-way hash function h(.) and a 
symmetric key cryptosystem (such as AES-256) with the encryption algorithm Ek(.) and a 
decryption algorithm Dk(.).   
B. Registration phase 
This phase is executed for a patient who wants to be a legal user in TMIS. All the steps are 
performed between the patient Ui and the telecare server S via a secure channel. The detail 
of the registration phase described as follows and illustrated in Fig. 2. 
Step R1: the patient Ui freely selects its identity IDi , its password PWi, and imprints its 
biometrics Bi via a sensor. Next, it generates a high entropy random integer Ni, and then 
computes i i iPB B N  , i i i iW ID PW PB   , (i iV h ID  )i iPW N  , ( )i i i i iZ h ID PW N PB    , 
where PBi is used to protect the patient’s biometrics from being compromised in case of the 
smart card is lost or stolen. Finally, the patient Ui sends the registration request message 
{IDi, Wi}  to the telecare server S. 
Step R2: after receiving the message {IDi, Wi}, the telecare server S records IDi into the 
identity table and then chooses a random integer R to generate Ui’s dynamic identity NID= 
( )mk iE ID R . Next, it computes ( )i iX h ID mk , i i iY X W   and then writes {NID, Yi, h(.), x} 
into the smart card. Finally, the telecare server S issues the smart card to the patient Ui. 
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Step R3: upon receiving the smart card, the patient Ui stores the parameters {Zi, Vi} into it 
secretly. Finally, the smart card contains {NID, Yi, Zi, Vi, h(.), x}. 
 
Fig. 2 The pictorial representation of registration phase 
C. Login phase 
In the login phase, the patient Ui performs following steps as shown in Fig. 3. 
Step L1: the patient Ui inserts its smart card into the card reader and then it inputs its 
identity IDi , its password PWi  and imprints its biometrics *iB via a sensor.  
Step L2:   the smart card computes ( )i i i iN V h ID PW    , ( )i i i i iPB h ID PW N Z     
and * *i i iPB B N  . Then it compares *iPB  with PBi. If the matching score *( , )i iPB PB  is 
beyond a predefined threshold value, the smart card terminates the login phase. Otherwise, 
it proceeds to next step. 
Step L3: the smart card chooses a random integer u, and then it 
computes ( ), ,u i i i i i i iT x W ID PW PB X Y W     , and ( ( ))i i i ua h ID X T x . Next, it sends the 
login request message 1 { , , ( )}i um NID a T x to the telecare server S over a public channel. 
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Fig. 3 The pictorial representation of login and authentication phases 
D. Authentication phase 
After receiving the login message, the telecare server S and the smart card perform the 
following steps to achieve mutual authentication and key agreement as shown in Fig. 3. 
Step A1: the telecare server S retrieves Ui’s original identity by decrypting NID via the 
master key mk and checks whether the extracted identity 'iID  is valid according to the 
identity table. If not, S terminates the session. Otherwise, it computes ' '( )iX h ID mk and 
verifies whether the following equation holds ' '( ( ))i i i ua h ID X T x . If not, the process stops, 
otherwise S generates two random integers *R and s to generate a new dynamic 
identity * ' *( )mk iNID E ID R . And then it calculates the shared session key '( ( ( )))s s usk h T T x . 
Next, the telecare   server S computes ' *( )s iM h sk ID NID  and '(i ib h ID  * )ssk NID NID , 
and then it deliveries 2 { , , ( )}i sm b M T x  to the patient Ui via a public channel. 
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Step A2: after receiving the message m2, the smart card computes ( ( ( )))u u ssk h T T x  to 
retrieve the dynamic identity * ( )u iNID M h sk ID   and then checks whether the value of bi 
is equivalent to *( )i uh ID sk NID NID . If they are not equal, the smart card stops this session. 
Otherwise, the patient Ui  believes that the telecare server S is a legal server and then it 
replaces the old NID by *NID . At last, the smart card computes *( )i i uc h ID sk NID  and 
submits 3 { }im c to the telecare server S via a public channel. 
Step A3: upon receiving the message m3, the telecare server S computes ' *( )i uh ID sk NID  and 
checks if the result is equal to ci. If the verification dissatisfies, it terminates this session, 
otherwise, the telecare server S believes that the patient Ui is a legal patient and sets the sks 
as their shared session key. 
E. Password and biometrics update phase 
This phase enables the legal patient Ui change its password and biometrics without 
communication with the telecare server S as shown in Fig. 4. 
Step P1: the patient Ui inserts its smart card into the card reader. And then it inputs its 
identity IDi , its password PWi  and imprints its biometrics *iB via a sensor.  
Step P2: the smart card computes ( )i i i iN V h ID PW   , 
( )i i i i iPB h ID PW N Z    and * *i i iPB B N  . Then it compares *iPB  with PBi If the matching 
score *( , )i iPB PB is beyond a predefined threshold value, the smart card rejects this 
request .Otherwise, the smart card returns the message (Request new password and 
biometrics) to the patient Ui.  
Step P3: the patient Ui selects a new password newiPB , a new random integer newiN , and 
imprints a new biometrics newiB via a sensor. 
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Step P4: upon receiving the new parameters, the smart card 
computes new new newi i iPB B N  , new newi i i iY Y PW PW   newi iPB PB  , ( )new new newi i i iV h ID PW N   , 
(newi iZ h ID  )new new newi i iPW N PB   and replaces the old parameters with ( , , )new new newi i iY V Z , 
respectively. 
 
Fig. 4 The pictorial representation of password and biometrics update phases 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
This section analyzes the security and functionality of our proposed scheme. Following the 
attack model defined in Section III, the adversary Eve can compromise the message 
{ , , , , ( ), }i i iNID Y Z V h x  stored in the smart card and record all the messages transmitted 
between the patient and the telecare server. Detailed analysis is described in this section.   
A. Replay attacks 
Suppose that an adversary Eve records the login request message m1 and replays it to the 
telecare server S intending to impersonate the patient Ui. However Eve cannot construct a 
valid *( | | )i i uc h ID sk NID to pass the verification process of the telecare server S unless she 
can correctly guess the shared session key sku, the identity IDi and the new dynamic 
identity *NID .However, when Eve tries to compute the session key sku by using the 
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intercepted message ( )sT x ,previous intercepted message ( )uT x and the random integer x 
stored in the smart card, she will face the Chaotic Map Computational Diffie-Hellman 
problem (CMCDHP). In addition, Eve also cannot extract the sks from the obtained 
message bi, since sks is protected by a secure hash function. Moreover, the patient identity 
IDi is protected by a secure one way hash function during the communication process, so 
the adversary Eve cannot extract IDi from the intercepted message. Furthermore, Eve 
cannot compromise the new dynamic identity * '( || )mk iNID E ID R  without the knowledge of 
patient identity 'iID , high entropy random integer R and the telecare server S’s master key 
mk. On the other hand, assume that the adversary Eve intercepts the login request message 
and replays a previous message m2 to the patient Ui. For the same reason, the adversary 
cannot construct a valid session key bi to pass the verification possess of patient Ui. So, the 
patient Ui will detect this replay attack easily by comparing the received bi and its 
computed value *( || || || )i uh ID sk NID NID .Therefore, the proposed scheme can withstand the 
replay attack. 
B. Modification attacks 
Suppose that the adversary Eve modifies ( )uT x  to * ( )uT x and sends *{ , , ( )}i uNID a T x to the 
telecare server S to impersonate the patient Ui. However, S can detect this attack by 
checking whether or not ' '( || || ( ))i i i ua h ID X T x holds. If the adversary Eve wants to pass the 
telecare server’s verification, she needs to construct a valid * ' ' *( || || ( ))i i i ua h ID X T x .However 
Eve cannot obtain 'iX without the knowledge of the master key mk and the patient identity 
IDi. In addition, she cannot calculate the valid 'iX by using the message Yi stored in the smart 
card without the knowledge of (IDi, PWi, PBi).  
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Assume that an adversary Eve modifies the message *{ , , ( )}i sb M T x and sends it to the patient 
Ui. Similarly, Eve needs to construct a valid * ' * *( || || || )i i sb h ID sk NID NID to pass the verification 
of the patient Ui. For the same reason discussed in the subsection 6.1, the adversary Eve 
will face the Chaotic Map Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CMCDHP).  
If an adversary Eve forges the message ci’ and sends it to the telecare server S to 
impersonate the patient Ui. The telecare server S can find out that ci’ is not equivalent to its 
computed value, since Eve cannot correctly guess the value of sk, IDi and NID. Therefore, 
the proposed scheme can resist the modification attack. 
C. Man-in-the-middle attacks 
In the proposed scheme, a session key sk can be shared only after mutual authentication 
between the patient Ui and the telecare server S. Therefore, if an adversary Eve attempts to 
make the telecare server S believes that it is talking to the patient Ui, she needs to pass the 
verification of S. However, for the same reason mentioned above Eve cannot pass this 
process without the knowledge of patient’s IDi and the secret value Xi. On the other hand, 
Eve also cannot construct a valid bi to pass the patient’s verification without knowing the 
message *( , , )i sID sk NID . So, the adversary cannot cheat the patient Ui to share a session key 
and make it believe that the key is shared with the telecare server S, and this judgment also 
works on S. Therefore, the adversary cannot launch the man-in-middle attack successfully 
to cheat either the patient or the telecare server in the proposed scheme.  
D. Password guessing attacks with smart card 
Assume that  an adversary  Eve  compromises  the  message {NID, Yi, Zi, Vi, h(.), x }stored 
in the smart card and then tries to guess  the patient’s password.  However, Eve cannot 
correctly guess the password by using the compromised message Vi 
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and ( ) ( (i i i i i i i i iZ h ID PW N PB h ID PW V h ID        )) ( )i i i i iPW B V h ID PW     , since 
the password is protected by the patient identity IDi  and the biometric data Bi .  Without the 
privacy message of the patient, Eve cannot determine whether the guessed password is 
correct or not.  In addition, Eve cannot guess the patient Ui’s password                              
from ( )i i i i i i iY X W h ID mk ID PW PB       without the knowledge of IDi, Bi and the 
master key mk. Therefore, the adversary cannot launch the password guessing attacks with 
the smart card successfully in the proposed scheme. 
E. Privileged-insider attacks 
The proposed scheme can resist the privileged-insider attack. That because in the 
registration phase, the patient Ui’s password is protected by its identity IDi, its biometric 
data Bi and a high entropy random integer Ni. So a malicious privileged-insider in the 
telecare server cannot obtain the patient’s password during the registration phase.   
F. Insider impersonation attacks  
Assume that the patient UA is a malicious patient who attempts to impersonate patient Ui to 
establish a session with the telecare server S.  Since the patient UA  is a legal user, it can go 
through the login process successfully. First, the patient UA  use its  privacy  message  to 
pass  the  verification and  then  it  UA computes ( ( ))A i A ua h ID X T x via patient Ui’s identity, 
and then sends message {NIDA, aA, Tu(x)} to the telecare server S. However this attack can 
be found easily, when the telecare server S checks the equation ' '( ( ))S A A u Aa h ID X T x a   . 
That because, the IDi in the message aA   is patient Ui’s identity and the 'AID  computed in the 
as is from UA.  So, the value of (IDi, XA) in aA are not equal to the value of ' '( , )A AID X in the as 
respectively. Therefore, in the proposed scheme, a legal but malicious patient cannot 
impersonate other legitimate patient to access to the telecare server. 
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G. Stolen smart card attacks 
Suppose   that   an   adversary  Eve   compromises  the  secret message  {NID, Yi, Zi, Vi, h(.), 
x } stored  in  the smart card and eavesdrops  transmitted  messages from the public 
network.  In order to establish an authorized session with the telecare server S, Eve needs to 
generate a valid ( ( ))i i i ua h ID X T x to pass the login verification. For the same reason 
discussed in the subsection A Replay attack, Eve cannot calculate a valid ai  without the 
knowledge of the master key mk and the patient identity IDi or the  message  IDi,  PWi,  and  
PBi. Therefore, in the proposed scheme, even if an adversary had stolen the patient’s smart 
card, it could not login on the telecare server via the compromised message stored in the 
smart card.  
H. Known Session Specific Temporary Information Attacks 
If the session key depends only on the secrecy of randomly generated values, it may cause 
a known session specific temporary information attacks [37]. In our scheme, the session 
key was calculated by the identity, the secret value Xi and the randomly generated values (u, 
s), so the proposed scheme can withstand the known session specific temporary 
information attack. 
I. Session key security 
In the proposed scheme, only the patient Ui and the telecare server S can calculate the 
session key ( ( ( )))s usk h T T x  ( ( ( )))u sh T T x since the random integer u and s generated by the 
patient Ui and the telecare server S are different in every session. In addition, since the 
session key sk is protected by a secure one way hash function, the adversary cannot obtain 
it from the intercepted bi or ci. Furthermore, even if an adversary obtains the 
message ( )uT x and ( )sT x from the public channel, and then compromise the secret x from the 
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smart card, she could not calculate the session key sk due to the hardness of CMDLP. 
Therefore, the proposed scheme achieves session key security. 
J. Known-key security 
An authentication scheme could provide known-key security if its execution could 
generate a unique session key and the compromise of this key has no impact on other 
session keys. In the proposed scheme, the session key ( ( ( )))s usk h T T x  ( ( ( )))u sh T T x is 
unique in each run of the authentication scheme.  That because the random integer u and s 
are generated randomly and independently by the patient Ui and the telecare server S 
respectively. So, in the proposed scheme, the compromised session key has no impact on 
others session keys since the session keys are different in every session.  Therefore, the 
proposed scheme can provide known- key security.  
K. Perfect forward secrecy 
An authentication scheme could provide perfect forward secrecy if the previous session 
keys cannot be compromised even both patient and telecare server’s secret keys are 
compromised. In the proposed scheme, the long-term secret key of the telecare S is the 
master key mk, and that of the patient Ui is the password PWi and the secret values {Yi, Zi, 
Vi, x} stored in the smart card. Assume that all the secrets mentioned above are 
compromised by an adversary Eve. When trying to calculate previous session 
key ( ( ( )))u ssk h T T x with the message (Ts(x), Tu(x), x), Eve will face the Chaotic Map 
Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP). Therefore, without the knowledge of the 
high entropy random integer u and s, the adversary Eve cannot figure out the previous 
session key. So, the proposed scheme can provide perfect forward secrecy. 
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L. User anonymity 
An authentication scheme could provide user anonymity if there is no adversary can 
compromise the patient’s identity by launching active or passive attacks in every phase. In 
the proposed scheme, any adversary cannot compromise the patient’s identity by launching 
active or passive attacks in every phase. In the registration phase, the identity of the patient 
Ui is protected by its password, its biometric data and a high entropy random integer, so the 
adversary Eve cannot obtain the patient’s real identity. During the login and authentication 
phase, the patient’s real identity is protected by a secure one way hash function and a 
secure symmetric encryption algorithm. Since there are no message need to be transmitted 
in the password and biometric update phase, the adversary cannot obtain the patient’s real 
identity throughout updating process. More- over,  the  adversary Eve  cannot  launch  a  
guessing attack  to obtain  the  patient Ui’s identity in the proposed  scheme.  That because, 
without the knowledge of Xi, Eve cannot guess IDi via ( ( ))i i i ua h ID X T x  successfully. So 
the adversary Eve cannot determine whether the guessed identity is correct or not. 
Similarly, Eve cannot obtain the correct identity by using the intercepted 
message ' *( )i i sb h ID sk NID NID or *( )i i sc h ID sk NID , since she has no capability to 
calculate sks or sku from the message (Ts(x), Tu(x), x) due to the hardness of CMDLP. 
Therefore, in the proposed scheme, nobody can know the real identity of the patient, except 
the patient himself and the telecare server. 
M. User untraceability 
In the proposed scheme, to further protect the patient’s real identity, the dynamic identity is 
changed by updating R during every session. Furthermore, the messages transmitted 
during the communication process in current session are also different with those of other 
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session, since the random integer u and s are chosen randomly and differently in every 
session. Therefore, an adversary cannot distinguish whether two intercepted messages 
belong to the same patient or not. So, the proposed scheme provides the user untraceability. 
N. Mutual authentication 
In the proposed scheme, the telecare server S and the patient Ui can authenticate each other 
by checking ci and bi, respectively. Therefore, the proposed scheme can achieve mutual 
authentication. 
O. Efficient login phase 
An authentication scheme achieves efficient login phase if the smart card can identify the 
incorrect input. In our scheme, assume that an adversary Eve compromise the patient Ui’s 
identity IDi  and its password PWi ,  and then it tries to login to the telecare server S, this 
illegal login will be detect by comparing the value  of *iPB and PBi.  Without the knowledge 
of patient’s biometric data Bi, the matching score of *( , )i iPB PB  will beyond a predefined 
threshold value. Then the smart card aborts the login session. 
On the other hand, if the patient Ui inputs a wrong IDi or PWi by accident, the login session 
will be also terminated even the biometric data is correct. Since the message PBi is 
constructed  by patient’s biometric data Bi and  a  random  integer  Ni which can be 
calculate  by  secret  Vi,  identity IDi  and  password, PWi  the wrong input of password or 
identity will cause the matching score of *( , )i iPB PB beyond a predefined threshold  value.  
Consequently, the smart card will abort the login request. Therefore, the proposed scheme 
achieves efficient login phase. 
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P. User friendly and efficient password and biometrics changes phase 
In the proposed scheme, the patient is allowed to change her/his password and biometrics 
freely without the telecare server’s assistance which makes the proposed scheme user- 
friendly. Since the smart card can verify the correctness of the input efficiently, a patient 
can change her/his password and biometrics correctly and efficiently. 
Q.  Biometrics protection  
In the proposed scheme, the patient’s biometric data is protected by a high entropy random 
integer Ni. So, even if the adversary obtains the smart card, she cannot retrieve the patient 
Ui’s biometric without the knowledge of the patient Ui’s identity IDi and password PWi. 
Therefore, the proposed scheme provides the biometrics protection. 
VI. SCHEME EVALUATION 
In this section, we first compare the security attributes of our proposed scheme with Mishra 
et al.’s scheme [26], Amin et al.’s scheme [28], Xu et al.’s [16] scheme, and other chaotic 
map-based authentication and key agreement schemes such as Lee [34], Mishra [35]. 
TABLE II lists security attributes comparisons between our proposed scheme and other 
related schemes. 
TABLE II 
Security attributes comparison with other pertinent authentication schemes 
Security 
attributes 
Lee 
[34]
Mis
hra 
[35]
Xu 
[16]
Mis
hra 
[26]
Ami
n 
[28]
Our
s 
Replay 
attacks 
√ √ √ × √ √ 
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Smart card 
theft attacks 
√ √ √ × √ √ 
Modificatio
n attacks 
√ √ √ × √ √ 
Man-in-the- 
middle 
attacks 
√ √ √ × √ √ 
Password 
guessing 
attacks 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
Privileged-i
nsider 
attacks 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
Insider 
impersonati
on attacks 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
Known 
session 
specific 
temporary 
information 
attack 
√ √ √ √ × √ 
Denial of × √ × √ √ √ 
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service 
attacks 
User 
anonymity 
√ √ √ × √ √ 
User 
untraceabili
ty 
√ √ √ × √ √ 
Mutual 
authenticati
on  
√ √ √ × √ √ 
Session key 
security  
√ √ √ × √ √ 
Perfect 
forward 
secrecy 
√ × √ × √ √ 
Efficient 
login and 
password 
and 
biometrics 
change 
phase 
× × × √ √ √ 
User-friendl × × × √ √ √ 
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y password 
change 
Biometrics 
protection 
- - - √ × √ 
As shown in TABLE II, the proposed scheme is secure against various attacks while 
provides many attractive features such as user anonymity, perfect forward secrecy, 
efficient login and password updating, which have not been considered or provided by 
other related schemes. Although Amin and Biswas’s scheme [28] also fixed the limitations 
of Mishra et al.’s scheme [26], their scheme suffered from the known session specific 
temporary information attack. Furthermore, since Amin and Biswas’s scheme [28] do not 
provide biometrics protection, the adversary could retrieve the patient Ui’s biometric 
template directly through obtaining the smartcard. 
Then, we compared the computational cost of our scheme with other relevant schemes as 
listed in TABLE III, where TC, TH, Th , TE, TA and Ts are the time complexity of the 
Chebyshev map operation, the Biohashing operation, the one-way hash operation, the 
scalar multiplication operation of elliptic curve, the point addition operation of elliptic 
curve, the symmetric key encryption/decryption operations, respectively. It is noted that 
the XOR operation is ignored because it’s running time is negligible.  
Compared with Chebyshev map and symmetric encryption/ decryption operations, the 
time complexity for one-way hash operation is very lightweight. TABLE III shows that the 
computational overhead of our scheme is lower than Mishra et al.’s [35], Xu et al.’s [16] 
and Amin et al.’s [28] schemes. Although Lee [34] and Mishra et al.’s schemes [26] are 
efficient than our proposed scheme, their scheme is vulnerable to some malicious attacks. 
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Furthermore, Mishra et al.’s scheme [26], Amin et al.’s scheme [28] and our proposed 
scheme require three times of message exchange to achieve mutual authentication and 
session key agreement whileas Xu et al.’s scheme [16] and other two chaotic map-based 
schemes [34, 35] need two times to finish mutual authentication and session key agreement. 
Furthermore, due to the usage of timestamps, these schemes will face the clock 
synchronization problem, which is difficult and expensive to be solved in TMIS 
environments [48]. Obviously, employing a timestamp mechanism to resist the replay 
attack is not suitable for TMIS. Therefore, the proposed scheme achieves a delicate balance 
between security and performance for TMIS in comparison with other related works. 
TABLE III 
Performance comparisons with other relevant authentication schemas 
Phase
s 
Lee 
[34] 
Mis
hra[
35] 
Xu
[16
] 
Mish
ra  
[26] 
Amin 
[28] 
Ours 
Regist
ration 4Th 
TC+ 
2Th 
1TE
TH+T
s 
+3Th 
TH+Ts
+ 
3Th 
Ts+3T
h  
Login 
1TC+ 
3Th 
2TC
+ 
4Th 
2TE
+ 
3Th
TH+ 
3Th 
TE+TH
+ 
3Th 
TC+ 
3Th 
Authe
ntica 
tion 
3TC+ 
8Th 
TC+ 
6Th 
3TE
+ 
7Th
2Ts+
10Th 
4TE+2
TAs+8
Th+2T
3TC+2
Ts 
+10Th
 31
s 
Passw
ord&b
iometr
ics 
update 
4Th 
3TC
+ 
11Th
2Th
2TH+
4Th 
TH+3
Th 
4Th 
Total 
4TC+ 
19Th 
6TC
+ 
23Th
6TE
+ 
14
Th 
4TH+
3Ts 
+20T
h 
5TE+2
TA+ 
3TH+
17Th+
3Ts 
4TC+3
Ts 
+20Th
Com
munic
ation 
round 
2 2 2 3 
3 
3 
In TABLE IV, we summarize the communication costs of our scheme and other related 
schemes. We assumes that the length of the hash function output digest, nonce, user 
identity, Chebyshev chaotic map and timestamp is 160-bit. To achieve 1024-bit RSA level 
security, a 160-bit ECC key is employed. The length of key for symmetric 
encryption/decryption is 256-bit. From TABLE IV, we conclude that our proposed scheme 
is more efficient than Lee’s scheme [34], Xu et al.’s scheme [16] and Amin et al.’s scheme 
[28], and as efficient as Mishra et al.’s scheme [26] in communication overhead. Although 
the communication overhead of our scheme is slightly higher than Mishra et al.’s [35], our 
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scheme avoids using timestamps and can resist various attacks and provide more security 
properties. Therefore, the proposed scheme achieves a delicate balance between security 
and performance for TMIS in comparison with other related schemes. 
TABLE IV 
Communication overhead comparisons with other relevant authentication schemes 
scheme 
Login 
phase 
Authentic
ation 
phase 
Total 
Lee [34] 800 bits 800 bits 1600 bits
Mishra[35] 640 bits 320 bits 960 bits 
Xu et al. 
[16] 
800 bits 640 bits 1440 bits
Mishra et 
al.[26] 
576 bits 736 bits 1312 bits
Amin et 
al.[28] 
736 bits 896 bits 1632 bits
Ours 576 bits 736 bits 1312 bits
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have demonstrated that Mishra et al.’s authentication scheme suffers from 
various attacks and fails to provide several security properties. And then, we have proposed 
a three-factor authenticated key agreement scheme by using chaotic map-based 
cryptography to address these problems. The proposed scheme realizes the protection of 
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medical data transmitted in the open channel and provides privacy protection during the 
remote diagnosing process, which enables the patient to enjoy the secure and convenient 
healthcare through the TMIS. Security analysis has proved that the proposed scheme can 
resist various attacks, and performance analysis has shown that the proposed scheme 
achieves better performance in comparison with other related schemes. Thus, the proposed 
scheme is more suitable for practical applications in TMIS environments. 
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